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Abstract
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 placed corporate managers in control of corporate debtors
in bankruptcy and of the bankruptcy process. Although the act remains law, between 2000 and
2001 it became common for creditors to control financially distressed firms and the bankruptcy
process. This study tests whether the change from manager to creditor control created or exacer-
bated managerial incentive to delay filing for bankruptcy or gave secured creditors an opportunity
to delay such filing. We observe a significant and prolonged deterioration in the financial condition
of firms that filed for bankruptcy after 2001 as compared to firms that filed before 2000. We also
observe patterns of operating losses and liquidations that suggest adverse economic consequences
from such delay.
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Corporate bankruptcy frequently leads to the dismissal of a debtor’s managers and the elimination of
its equity interest. To protect their own jobs and to extend the option held by the shareholders who
appoint them managers may delay a firm’s bankruptcy filing. The greater the likelihood of a harsh
landing for managers and shareholders, the greater the incentive to delay. Chapter 11 bankruptcy prac-
tice effectively cushioned managers and shareholders from bankruptcy’s consequences. Pre-bankruptcy
managers typically retained control of the debtor and the reorganization process at least for a time
after the bankruptcy case was filed. These managers were often able to use such control to obtain new,
management-friendly finance. At the end of the bankruptcy process, the debtor often avoided liqui-
dation and the pre-bankruptcy shareholders frequently retained an interest in the reorganized debtor
even though creditors were not paid in full. Many managers ultimately lost their jobs, nonetheless,
and the return to equity was small. Still, the results were less severe for managers and shareholders
than an immediate turnover of the firm to creditors, or forced liquidation, at the outset of the case.
Between 2000 and 2001, this dynamic changed. Creditors, and particularly secured creditors, began
to take a more active role in the management of financially distressed debtors, both before and after
a debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The new role of these creditors and management’s
reaction are the subject of this paper.
The recent changes in finance and bankruptcy practice are not the result of an amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code and have no single cause. Rather they represent a holistic change prompted by
an alteration in investor approach, perhaps facilitated by a change in the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”). In a development that became prominent in or about the year 2000, dominant lenders now
routinely write control provisions into their debt instruments. Once triggered by specified events of
financial distress, these provisions shift control over a debtor’s financial decisions from equity-appointed
management to the creditor. A reinforcement of this development was the widespread adoption in
2001 of UCC §9-104, which newly permits a security interest in bank accounts. This provision allows
a dominant creditor to insist on a broad security interest and thereby eliminate a financially distressed
debtor’s free cash as the debtor declines toward bankruptcy. Consequently, in the period after 2001
more than in the period prior to 2000, a corporate debtor enters bankruptcy without discretion over
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its operating capital and with a dominant creditor as the sole source of such capital. Even though a
debtor’s managers formally retain control of the debtor, as a practical matter, a creditor who controls
liquidity is in command of the debtor and the bankruptcy process.
There has been a transformation as well in judicial attitude. Between 2000 and 2001 it became common
for courts to approve creditor-control terms in Debtor-in-Possession (“DIP”) financing. Moreover, in
the post 2001 period, courts were much more likely to approve the liquidation of debtors in bankruptcy
and a zero return to pre-bankruptcy shareholders.
We offer the following two hypotheses: First, these new-era changes in finance and bankruptcy practice
delay the onset of bankruptcy, where delay is measured as the degree of financial distress at the time
of a debtor’s bankruptcy petition. Second, the delay permits destruction in economic value, where
destruction is measured by a debtor’s continued operating losses at the time of bankruptcy. The first
of these is a joint hypothesis. Managers may retain control of the debtor pre-bankruptcy despite the
expansion of secured credit and creditor-control provisions, or secured creditors may use this expansion
to gain control early. If the former, managers on their own behalf or on behalf of shareholders favor
delay and the hope of a turnaround. If the latter, secured creditors favor delay rather than early
bankruptcy, which may impose on the secured creditor costly collection delay or otherwise impede
collection despite the relatively more favorable recent bankruptcy regime. In either case, control-party
self interest externalizes the costs of delay in bankruptcy initiation and the bankruptcy process loses
the opportunity to stem any economic loss. Thus, our second hypothesis.
Our data on large, publicly traded U.S. companies support our hypotheses. At the time of bankruptcy
petition, debtors that filed after 2001 are in significantly worse financial condition than debtors that
filed prior to 2000. Either managers are able to evade creditor-control covenants and otherwise fore-
stall creditor control as debtors sink into financial distress, or secured creditors obtain control early
and share managers’ incentive for the delay of bankruptcy initiation. Our data do not support an
alternative hypothesis that secured creditors both gain early control and exercise such control to insist
on bankruptcy petitions earlier in the course of a debtor’s financial distress. Importantly, our data also
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suggest that delay is costly. Debtors that filed for bankruptcy after 2001 suffer significantly greater
economy- and industry- adjusted operating losses than those that filed before 2000. Put simply, the
delay of a bankruptcy petition burns value.
Our results do not appear to be a product of screening, or censored-sample effect. Specifically, if in
the post-2001 period more than in the pre-2000 period, creditors gain control of debtors and rescue
the economically viable debtors with out-of-bankruptcy workouts, only the weakest debtors would be
left to file for bankruptcy. This hypothesis predicts a lower incidence of bankruptcy in the post 2001
period. We find no such reduction in bankruptcy rates even after we control for general economic
conditions. Thus, we reject the hypothesis of a screening or censored sample effect driving our results.
Our results notwithstanding, it is possible the changes brought about in the new era of Chapter 11
(post 2001) may be, on net, economically beneficial as compared to the earlier regime (pre 2000).
As noted, liquidations in the new era are far more common than in the past. Where liquidation
prevents the reorganization of inviable firms, it may preserve more value than destroyed by the delay
in bankruptcy petitions. Nevertheless, because the new era engenders delay in bankruptcy filing and
consequent waste, a better regime would address the bankruptcy initiation problem as well as the
disposition of assets in bankruptcy.
In the next section, we review the academic literature and discuss recent changes in bankruptcy
practice as well as how these have reduced the incentives of managers to file for bankruptcy early; we
also discuss the possible role of the dominant secured creditor in the bankruptcy initiation decision in
the context of our hypotheses and summarize our results.
In Section 3 we present our data and methodology. Our main results are contained in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses the relationship between our results and various assumptions we make. Finally,
Section 6 provides our conclusions.
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I Background
A standard, if imprecise, characterization of the relationship between corporate debt and equity is
to say that equity is a call option on the firm’s assets with the strike price equal to the amount of
the debt. Bankruptcy accelerates the maturity of debt, and thus of equity’s option. Consequently,
one might expect that neither equity nor its agent, corporate management, has an incentive to bring
a debtor into bankruptcy, particularly if the debtor is insolvent and equity’s option thus out of the
money. From these premises (and because the Bankruptcy Code §302(h) permits the debtor to quash a
creditor’s bankruptcy petition unless a debtor fails to pay its debts when due), Jackson (1986) reasons
that one should expect firms to enter bankruptcy late even if an earlier bankruptcy filing would permit
(or require) the firm to allocate its resources more efficiently, either in reinvestment of funds otherwise
devoted to debt service or in liquidation of an unprofitable business venture.
Studies by Bris et al. (2004) and Donoher (2004) support the supposition that the option value of
equity induces managers to delay the filing of a bankruptcy petition. To date, however, evidence of the
potential harm caused by such delay has been sparse and mixed. Standard finance theory, dating from
Jensen and Meckling (1976), predicts that managers of an insolvent firm will substitute unjustifiably
risky projects for safer more profitable ventures, a phenomenon known as the“debt overhang problem”
or as “overinvestment” (in the risky projects) and“underinvestment” (in the safer ones). In an attempt
to verify this theory, researchers have examined firms to see if they alter their business practices as
they face financial distress. These studies have concluded that firms do not alter their practices. See,
e.g., Andrade and Kaplan (1998); Dahiya et al. (2003); Eckbo and Thorburn (2003).
These results, however, do not imply the absence of a debt overhang problem, or that a delay in
bankruptcy filing does not exacerbate any such problem, because an insolvent debtor’s baseline of
business as usual may itself indicate over- and underinvestment. Consider, for example, the following
illustration. Suppose a firm must choose among its current activity but with an increased investment in
inventory, the status quo of operation despite thin inventory, and liquidation where all of its assets are
sold off to other firms. Without a recapitalization, and cancellation of equity, the firm might be unable
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to finance the new inventory and liquidation might directly eliminate equity’s stake. Consequently,
the firm might choose the status quo even if, from an efficiency perspective, the status quo is the worst
of the three options. Yet a study equating debt-overhang inefficiency with a change from the status
quo would (falsely) find no inefficiency.
Although upon financial distress both economically sound and economically unsound firms may con-
tinue as before, one can indirectly examine the relationship between financial and economic distress.
Hotchkiss (1995) examines publicly traded firms filing for bankruptcy between 1979 and 1988 and
finds these firms suffer operating losses in the years preceding (and following) bankruptcy, and these
losses are greater than any general downward trend in the industry would explain. She concludes that
these firms are not merely financially distressed but economically distressed as well. This conclusion
seems reasonable to us. To be sure, a firm might suffer operating losses as part of an inevitably
difficult process towards profitability, and undoubtedly this is true for many start-up firms. However,
the 1980s experiment with highly leveraged transactions notwithstanding, we do not suppose investors
will set up their firms to fail financially while they are economically sound, and so we do not believe
a firm experiencing both financial distress and continuing operating losses is proceeding according to
expectations. Indeed, a core function of debt in capital structure is to establish hard earnings targets
that a firm must meet as a price of continuation. See, e.g., Hart and Moore (1998). As suggested
by Jensen (1988) and explored by Adler (1998), while financial distress can be the result of a single
or limited number of exogenous shocks, continuing losses are more likely to be the product of an
endogenous defect in the firm.
More recent studies ostensibly call Hotchkiss’ (1995) results into question. For example, Andrade
and Kaplan (1998), cited above, examine firms that became highly leveraged in the 1980s and then
filed for bankruptcy. The authors observe that these firms operated efficiently up until and through
their bankruptcy filings. But Andrade and Kaplan specifically chose highly leveraged firms to isolate
the effects of financial distress (defined as operating profit insufficient to cover interest costs) and
those of economic distress (defined as operating losses). Thus, their paper does not offer (or intend to
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offer) any insight into whether as a general matter financially distressed firms are also economically
distressed. Another example is Maksimovic and Phillips (1998), which studies manufacturing firm
bankruptcies for the same period studied by Hotchkiss (1995). These authors find no difference in the
operating efficiency of manufacturing plants of firms that filed for bankruptcy and their financially
sound counterparts. This study, however, does not attempt to examine other aspects of a firm’s
efficiency, including a firm’s distribution or sales operation. It may well be that the difference between
a viable firm and an inviable one, particularly in a competitive industry, turns on these or related
factors rather than on a manufacturer’s ability to churn out product. To illustrate this point, albeit at
the risk of caricature, one would not be surprised if a stapler fastened paper together as well at Enron
as it did at Microsoft, yet one would not conclude from this that the two firms were equally efficient.
Consequently, one might conclude, as did Hotchkiss (1995), that many debtors in bankruptcy are not
only financially distressed but economically distressed as well.
While the literature does address the questions of whether financially distressed firms delay bankruptcy
filings and whether such firms suffer economic distress at the time of such filings, to the best of our
knowledge, no prior study has examined the important question of whether bankruptcy law or its
process affects the timing of bankruptcy filings. Recent changes in United States commercial law
and bankruptcy practice create an opportunity to answer this question. Between 1978-when the
current Bankruptcy Code was enacted-and about 2001, a bankruptcy petition did not mean the end
of management control over the debtor.
Unlike the law of other countries (e.g. Canada and the U.K.), the U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not
mandate that a trustee takes over the control of a firm upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Quite
to the contrary, Code §1104 provides for the appointment of a trustee only after a hearing establishes
that such an appointment is in the interest of the creditors or shareholders.
Appointment of a trustee is an unusual event in the United States. Instead it is typical for the
firm to remain under the control of the debtor’s managers, referred to in the Bankruptcy Code as
simply the“debtor”or the“debtor-in-possession.”Significantly, such control ordinarily extends beyond
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management of the firm’s operations but to the reorganization process itself. The Code, §1121, grants
the debtor the exclusive right for 120 days to propose a plan of reorganization and an additional 60
days to have the plan approved by the affected classes of claims or interests. Moreover, as documented
by Weiss and Wruck (1998), at least until recently, judges often extended the exclusive period.1 These
rules had significant consequences, not only for managers but for shareholders whose option on a
debtor’s assets expire in bankruptcy. Bebchuk and Chang (1992) model how management’s ability
to delay resolution of the bankruptcy process can lead to concessions by creditors to managers and
shareholders, and there is evidence to support the validity of this model. Although Gilson (1990)
reports that 57% of CEOs and 54% of directors do lose their jobs when a debtor files for bankruptcy
(in a 5 year period starting with the year of bankruptcy filing), the residual who retain their jobs
do much better, of course, than they would under a more draconian system, such as those of other
countries, that ousts management upon the firm’s bankruptcy petition.2 Regarding a firm’s equity
owners, Weiss (1990), among others, documents concessions to shareholders who received a return even
when assets were insufficient to repay creditors in full.3 Thus, until recent changes, the bankruptcy
process represented a relatively “soft landing” for corporate managers and shareholders4.
Prompted in part by a change in the Uniform Commercial Code, as noted in the introduction, in or
around the year 2000, a sea change occurred away from debtor control, and toward creditor control
of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. As adopted by the states in the late 1990s the new UCC
§9-104 permits a creditor to take a security interest in a debtor’s bank accounts. Armed with this
new tool, it is now common for a debtor’s dominant secured creditor to secure pledges of a debtor’s
liquid assets as the firm moves toward insolvency or becomes more deeply insolvent. As insolvency
sets in or worsens, it has become more common for debtors to trigger loan covenants that vest control
1The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 now limits the court’s discretion to grant
extensions, but for reasons that should become clear below, this recent development is inapposite to the discussion of
this paper.
2Gilson (1990) finds that only 17% of CEOs and 15% of board members leave a firm in the year of bankruptcy filing
compared to the year before the filing.
3See also Franks and Torous (1989) and Eberhart et al. (1990).
4As noted above, managers will not always serve shareholder interests. Moreover, as a legal matter, a director’s
fiduciary duty may shift from shareholders towards creditors as a firm sinks into insolvency. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland v. Path Communications 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991), which holds that once a firm is in the
vicinity of insolvency, the directors’ duties are to the corporation as an entity, and thus in part to creditors, rather than
to the shareholders alone. Still, managers, many themselves shareholders, may represent shareholders’ interests at least
while there is a possibility of a return to shareholders.
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of the debtor in the secured creditor. Moreover, in 2001 almost all U.S. jurisdictions adopted the new
UCC §9-104, which permits a creditor to take a security interest in a debtor’s bank accounts. Armed
with this new tool, it is now common for a debtor’s dominant secured creditor to secure pledges
of a debtor’s liquid assets as the firm moves toward insolvency or becomes more deeply insolvent.
Consequently, debtors now frequently enter bankruptcy with little or no liquid assets and require
an immediate debtor-in-possession (or “DIP”) loan to continue in business, with the pre-bankruptcy
secured lender, who already has an interest in and knowledge of the debtor, in a unique position
to provide such a loan. Given the strong creditor position, and a new judicial attitude that favors
creditor control, secured lenders are as a practical matter increasingly able to dictate the outcome of
the reorganization process. The Bankruptcy Code continues formally to grant control of the debtor
and the reorganization process to the DIP, but as a condition of the DIP loan, the secured creditor
demands that the debtor’s managers contractually cede such control if the transfer of control has not
already taken place. These demands are frequently met, often before the bankruptcy petition is even
filed, and courts now enforce such bargains. Not only do managers lose control of the debtor and
reorganization process, but once in control, creditor concessions to shareholders become unnecessary.5
Since the beginning of this decade, therefore, for many or most publicly traded firms, the bankruptcy
process has represented a “hard landing” as compared to earlier times.
These changes have been documented, prominently, by other scholars. Skeel (2003) describes the
new practice as “adjustments creditors have made in an effort to reassert control in bankruptcy”.
Baird and Rasmussen (2002, 2003) argue that DIP lenders “have come effectively to control the
bankruptcy process.” There is disagreement over whether the changes have been for better or worse.
Baird and Rasmussen (2002, 2003), for example, conclude that creditor control has been largely
beneficial, permitting creditors efficiently to screen viable firms from inviable ones without interference
from managers or shareholders who have a perverse investment incentive. In contrast, Skeel (2003),
as well as LoPucki (2003) and Warren and Westbrook (2003), believe that creditor control unduly
permits creditor destruction of viable firms. More specifically, Warren and Westbrook (2003) decry
5Weiss and Capkun (2006) support this argument and find a sharp decrease in absolute priority violations in the
2000-2001 period compared to the pre-2000 period.
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the shift from the DIP to what they call the SPIP (secured-party-in-possession), and lament that
Chapter 11 has become “a sort of Super Article 9, invoked for the benefit of a single secured creditor,”
a development they see as a problem that requires congressional response. Regardless of the academic
debate over the merits of the shift in bankruptcy practice, no one disputes that such a shift has
occurred.
The increased role creditors now have in Chapter 11 leaves managers and shareholders more at the
mercy of creditors than was the case under prior practice. This leads to a proposition we test here.
If managers are rational, all else equal, they should have been more willing to bring a firm under
the supervision of the bankruptcy process, where the capital structure can be corrected and the
perverse investment incentives of debt overhang eliminated, in the pre 2000 soft landing period than
under current practice. Managers now may more frequently exacerbate or extend financial distress,
including by incurring new debt, rather than filing for bankruptcy. This relationship should hold true
even for firms that are economically distressed. As we explain more fully below, our data support
this proposition. Even after controlling for economy-wide and industry-wide effects, financial ratios
of firms filing for bankruptcy prior to 2000 were significantly better than the same ratios for firms
filing after 2001. By contrast, a sample of non-bankrupt firms showed no change or an improvement
in financial ratios post 2001. This suggests that in the more recent period managers are resisting
bankruptcy longer than in the past all while the firm’s finances deteriorate.
It is also possible that the dominant secured creditor who gains control of the debtor prior to
bankruptcy6 will delay filing for bankruptcy to satisfy its own claims in advance of the bankruptcy. A
secured creditor might prefer payment to bankruptcy if its control over the bankruptcy process would
be incomplete such that the secured creditor, despite its dominance, would make concessions to junior
claims, as a prudential matter or by operation of the law.7 Our results are consistent with secured
creditor delay of bankruptcy but may simply reflect that secured creditor control prior to bankruptcy
is either not extensive or not fully effective. That is, one would expect the opposite of our results
6As described in Baird and Rasmussen (2005), the seeds of creditor control can predate financial distress, as bank
loans, made in good times, often contain control-shift triggers in the event of such distress.
7See, e.g., United Savings v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365 (1988), which denied a secured creditor the
reinvestment income for the duration of the bankruptcy case on the value of the creditor’s collateral.
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if secured creditors had an incentive to file early petitions, perhaps in the interest of efficiency, and
routinely gained early pre-bankrutpcy control of debtors in the post-2001 period. Thus, our results
support the conjecture that either secured creditors share management’s incentive for delay or man-
agement can delay the onset of secured creditor control. Moreover, our results are consistent with
management using a relatively early bankruptcy petition in the pre 2000, debtor friendly, bankruptcy
process to avoid creditor control both pre and post filing.
Our data also identify firms that suffer continual operating losses at the time of their bankruptcy
filings (operating losses for at least a year prior to the bankruptcy filing). Consistent with Hotchkiss
(1995), most firms in our sample filing for bankruptcy have suffered continued operating losses, and
to a greater extent than industry counterparts outside of bankruptcy. For these firms, which are
destroying value as they operate, worsening financial ratios reflect not only accruing unpaid interest
but a reduction in asset value. We find for these firms relative deterioration in financial ratios and
extended, greater operating losses at the time of filing in the later (post 2001) period compared to
the earlier (pre 2000) period. Moreover, to a much greater extent in the latter period than in the
former, liquidation is the resolution of insolvency in bankruptcy. We have not conducted a formal
analysis of continuation or liquidation decisions in bankruptcy, and it is possible the delay in filing
does not imply a delay in liquidation. However, the increased number of liquidations is consistent
with the delay in filing for bankruptcy permitting an inefficient continuation of operations that might
have been avoided by an earlier filing. Our results support the hypothesis that delayed filing in the
post 2001 period delays inevitable, efficient liquidation, renders an otherwise salvageable company
unsalvageable, or both.
As a theoretical matter, we cannot rule out the possibility of a censored sample in the post 2001
period. Specifically, in the latter period more than in the earlier, managers or secured creditors in
control of debtors may solve financial distress without resort to bankruptcy. If a larger number of firms
now restructured or liquidated outside of bankruptcy were disproportionally higher quality firms, with
poorer firms eventually filing for bankruptcy, then the greater deterioration of bankrupt firms in the
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later period may be an artifact of our sample. If this were the case, however, we would expect a higher
incidence of bankruptcy in the pre 2000 period than in the post 2001 period, controlling for general
economic conditions, and we do not observe this pattern. Rather we find that bankruptcy rates in
the US (inversely) followed GDP growth rates over our sample periods and that bankruptcy rates are
higher in the SPIP than in the DIP period despite relative improvements in GDP. These observations
are documented in Table I. Thus, we do not attribute our results to the nature of our sample.
These results challenge, or at least limit, the conclusion, in Baird and Rasmussen (2002, 2003), e.g.,
that the new hard landing regime in Chapter 11 is beneficial as it allows creditors quickly to liquidate
firms that should not continue under current management.8
Regarding these last points, on the potential benefits of the new Chapter 11, creditor control of Chapter
11 may permit efficient resolutions once a debtor enters bankruptcy. However, the very creditor control
yielding such a benefit ex post may exacerbate losses ex ante due to the incentive it provides managers
of those firms to delay bankruptcy filing. Put simply, although a creditor controlled bankruptcy process
(at least one in which the creditor in control cannot exploit others) may facilitate beneficial liquidation,
it may be that by the time creditors gain control in bankruptcy there is less to liquidate; it is not
certain, as a theoretical matter, whether the old soft landing regime or the new hard landing regime
is more efficient. (For other work discussing the ex ante versus ex post tradeoffs between a hard and
soft-landing regime, see Bebchuk (2002), Povel (1999), and Adler (1992)). One might have thought
that a trend toward creditor control before bankruptcy would eliminate this tradeoff and simply favor
early, efficient liquidations, but our data do not support this hypothesis. A more complete solution
to debtor misbehavior should include not only creditor control of the bankruptcy process but, as
proposed by Adler (1998), some remedy to the bankruptcy initiation problem, such as a rule that
would impede out-of-bankruptcy loans to an insolvent firm.
8See also Jensen (1991), which argues that private workouts, such as those that are now routine within Chapter 11
practice, are likely to enhance efficiency.
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II Data and Methodology
In this section we describe the collection of the sample of bankrupt firms, our choice of economic
measures and financial ratios, as well as our methodology for analyzing the data. We also document
several characteristics of changes in bankrupt firms over time compared to the changes in the economic
environment and non-bankrupt firms.
A Firms Filing for Chapter 11
We identify 827 firms filing for Chapter 11 over the 12 year period from January 1993 to March 2004
using Edward Altman’s database of corporate bankruptcies. This database provides a comprehen-
sive list of all large firms filing for bankruptcy (with liabilities exceeding $100 million).9 Next, we
obtained the date of the last reported financial statements from the Compustat database. All finan-
cial information about these firms we also obtained from the Compustat database. We eliminated
all financial institutions (they have unique financial statements that are not comparable with other
industrial firms), all firms that had not published an annual or quarterly financial report within 365
days prior to the Chapter 11 filing, and all firms with total liabilities (in at least one of the 4 quarters
prior to bankruptcy filing) less than $ 100 million. Our final sample contains 443 firms.
The Compustat database provides the SIC codes of the firms in our sample and we classified firms
with SIC codes above 6000 as service firms and all the others as non-service firms. Table II presents
the sample of bankrupt firms and their selected financial characteristics prior to Chapter 11 filing.
Out of the total number of firms in the sample, 358 are non-service firms and 85 are service firms. On
average, firms in the sample have total assets and total liabilities prior to bankruptcy of just under
$1.5 billion and just over $1.34 billion, respectively. The range includes firms with assets from $23
million to $104 billion and with debt from $59 million to $52 billion prior to the bankruptcy filing.
Average long term debt prior to bankruptcy filing is $464 million, ranging from $82 million to $29.3
9Adjusting total liabilities for inflation would not change our conclusions as such adjustment would leave our sample
virtually unchanged.
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billion. Sales in the last four quarters range from $1.24 million to $179.4 billion with a mean of $1.35
billion and a median of $378 million, while net income ranges from $-7.3 billion to $920 million with a
mean of -$294 million and a median of $-81 million. On average, bankrupt firms have a leverage (total
liabilities/total assets) of 1.25 (median of 1.05) and a current ratio (current assets/current liabilities)
of 0.85 (median of 0.58). Operating income before and after depreciation average -1.62% (median of
1.75%) and -8.42% (median of -4.53%), respectively.
Table III presents the annual distribution of Chapter 11 filings. The largest number of bankruptcies
were filed in 2001 (109) and 2002 (77) equaling 25% and 17% of the sample, respectively. This is
consistent with what Altman and Jha (2003) find for defaulted and distressed securities.
B Economic Measures and Financial Ratios
We predict the economic and financial health of firms filing for bankruptcy will deteriorate in the
SPIP period as managers will delay filing. We consider also the possibility that in the SPIP period
secured creditors may take control of a debtor prior to a bankruptcy petition. If such creditors favor
early bankruptcy petitions and gain control of debtors soon enough to accomplish such early filing, our
prediction will not be supported by the evidence. To test our prediction, we use financial reports to
compute fourteen measures of economic or financial condition for every firm in the sample as follows:
Predicted change in economic measures and financial ratios is shown by ⇓ and ⇑ arrows.
1. ⇓⇒ 4-quarter operating income
4− quarter −Operating − Income−Before−Depreciation− and−Amortization
Beginning −Balance− of − Total −Assets (1)
The 4-quarter operating return on assets variable proxies for the ability of a firm to generate
positive cash flow in the year prior to bankruptcy filing. We believe that in the SPIP period,
as compared to the DIP period, there will be a longer interval between the onset of economic
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distress and the filing of a bankruptcy petition. So we predict that this ratio will be lower in the
SPIP period than the DIP period. This said, if distress typically occurs in both periods more
than a year prior to a bankruptcy filing, the explanatory power of this variable may be weak.
2. ⇓⇒ 4-quarter operating income-da
4− quarter −Operating − Income−After −Depreciation−And−Amortization
Beginning −Balance− of − Total −Assets (2)
The 4-quarter operating income after depreciation variable proxies for operating performance
and economic distress. We believe that in the SPIP period, as compared to the DIP period, there
will be a longer interval between the onset of economic distress and the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. So we predict that this ratio will be lower in the SPIP period than the DIP period.
This said, if distress typically occurs in both periods more than a year prior to a bankruptcy
filing, the explanatory power of this variable may be weak.
3. ⇓⇒ 4-quarter operating income-da-ei
4− quarter −Operating − Income−After −Depreciation,Extraord.− Items,DO
Beginning −Balance− of − Total −Assets (3)
The 4-quarter operating income variable proxies for performance in the year prior to bankruptcy
filing including adjustments for discontinued operations and extraordinary items. We believe
that in the SPIP period, as compared to the DIP period, there will be a longer interval between
the onset of economic distress and the filing of a bankruptcy petition. So we predict that this
ratio will be lower in the SPIP period than the DIP period. This said, if distress typically occurs
in both periods more than a year prior to a bankruptcy filing, the explanatory power of this
variable may be weak.
4. ⇓ 8-quarter operating income
8− quarter −Operating − Income−Before−Depreciation− and−Amortization
Beginning −Balance− of − Total −Assets (4)
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The 8-quarter operating income variable proxies for the ability of firm to generate positive cash
flow and economic distress in the two year period prior to bankruptcy filing. The firm will have
less difficulties meeting its obligations if the positive cash flow increases. We believe that in the
SPIP period, as compared to the DIP period, there will be a longer interval between the onset
of economic distress and the filing of a bankruptcy petition. So we predict that this ratio will
be lower in the SPIP period than the DIP period.
5. ⇓ 8-quarter operating income-da
8− quarter −Operating − Income−After −Depreciation−And−Amortization
Beginning −Balance− of − Total −Assets (5)
The 8-quarter operating income after depreciation variable proxies for the operating performance
and economic distress in the two year period prior to bankruptcy filing. As profitability increases,
the firm will have less difficulties meeting its obligations. We believe that in the SPIP period,
as compared to the DIP period, there will be a longer interval between the onset of economic
distress and the filing of a bankruptcy petition. So we predict that this ratio will be lower in
the SPIP period than the DIP period.
6. ⇓ 8-quarter operating income-da-ei
8− quarter −Operating − Income−After −Depreciation,Extraord.− Items
Beginning −Balance− of − Total −Assets (6)
The 8-quarter operating income variable proxies for the performance in the two-year period prior
to bankruptcy filing including adjustments for discontinued operations and extraordinary items.
As profitability increases, the firm will have less difficulties meeting its obligations. We believe
that in the SPIP period, as compared to the DIP period, there will be a longer interval between
the onset of economic distress and the filing of a bankruptcy petition. So we predict that this
ratio will be lower in the SPIP period than the DIP period.
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7. ⇑ Quarters of operating losses
Number−of−Quarters−of−Operating−Losses−in−8−Quarters−Prior−to−Filing (7)
The number of quarterly operating losses proxies for the duration of economic distress. We
predict this number will increase in the SPIP period compared to the DIP period as firms suffer
a longer period of economic distress prior to filing for bankruptcy.
8. ⇑ Quarters of operating losses -da-ei
Number−of−Quarters−of−Operating−Losses−in−8−Quarters−Prior−to−Filing (8)
The number of quarterly operating losses after depreciation, amortization, extraordinary items
and discontinued operations proxies for the duration of economic distress. We predict this
number will increase in the SPIP period compared to the DIP period as firms suffer a longer
period of economic distress prior to filing for bankruptcy.
9. ⇓⇒ Change in assets-1 year
Ending −Balance− of − Total −Assets
Beginning −Balance− of − Total −Assets (9)
The 4-quarter change in assets variable proxies for the reduction in a firm’s value in the year
prior to its bankruptcy filing. Because we wish to test whether firms have a greater incentive to
delay filing in the SPIP than in the DIP period, and because we assume that firms weaken as
they approach bankruptcy, we predict that this ratio will be lower in the SPIP period compared
to the DIP period. This said, if distress typically occurs in both periods more than a year prior
to a bankruptcy filing, the explanatory power of this variable may be weak.
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10. ⇓ Change in assets-2 year
Ending −Balance− of − Total −Assets
Beginning −Balance− of − Total −Assets (10)
The 8-quarter change in assets variable proxies for the reduction in a firm’s value in the two years
prior to its bankruptcy filing. Because we wish to test whether firms have a greater incentive to
delay filing in the SPIP than in the DIP period, and because we assume that firms weaken as
they approach bankruptcy, we predict that this ratio will be lower in the SPIP period compared
to the DIP period. This variable, we predict, will explain more than than the variable for one-
year change in assets because we believe a two-year decline prior to bankruptcy is relatively
unlikely in the DIP period.
11. Size
ln(Total −Assets) (11)
Ln(Total-Assets) proxies for the size of bankrupt firms. We expect firms’ financial characteristics
to vary across size. Controlling for this variable is expected to remove those differences. Previous
research indicates that leverage and the probability of bankruptcy vary across size.
12. ⇓ Current ratio-year end
Fiscal − Y ear − End− Current−Assets
F iscal − Y ear − End− Current− Liabilities (12)
The year end current ratio proxies for the ability of a firm to meet liabilities as they come due.
Because we wish to test whether firms have a greater incentive to delay filing in the SPIP than
in the DIP period, and because we assume that firms weaken as they approach bankruptcy, we
predict that this ratio will be lower in the SPIP period compared to the DIP period. Using
the fiscal year end current ratio instead of the current ratio from the last quarter prior to the
bankruptcy avoids consideration of defaults in the last quarter where long term debt becomes
current; long term debt is considered in other ratios.
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13. ⇓ Long term debt/total assets
Long − Term−Debt
Total −Assets (13)
The long term debt ratio is a measure of a firm’s indebtedness. We predict this ratio will
decrease in the SPIP period compared to the DIP period as more firms will default before filing
for bankruptcy increasing current liabilities and decreasing long term debt.
14. ⇑ Leverage
Total − Liabilities
Total −Assets (14)
Leverage is a measure of a firm’s indebtedness as a proportion of its assets. Because we wish to
test whether firms have a greater incentive to delay filing in the SPIP than in the DIP period,
and because we assume that firms weaken as they approach bankruptcy, we predict that this
ratio will be higher in the SPIP period compared to the DIP period.
These measures and ratios are standard ones that reflect the overall economic and financial health of
a firm. Needless to say there are countless possible measures and ratios. Our goal is not to find the
best measures and ratios for any particular purpose, but merely to determine if there is a significant
change in the economic or financial health of firms in the SPIP as compared to DIP period.
In order to compute measures and ratios from quarterly financial statements we use 12 month moving
cumulative sales, costs of goods sold, depreciation and amortization, as well as operating income
before and after depreciation, amortization and extraordinary items, and the beginning and ending 12
month period balances for all the other accounts. Due to data availability, not all the measures and
ratios could be computed for all the firms in the sample. Since 239 (54%) firms had negative equity
according to the last report filed before bankruptcy, the return on equity ratio (ROE) is omitted from
the presentation. However, we will continue to discuss the number of firms having negative equity in
the paper as one of the indicators of firms’ health.
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III Empirical Analysis, Results and Discussion
In this section we present and analyze our results. We first offer some general statistics about our
data, then discuss the sample as divided between the DIP and SPIP periods.
A General Observations
Table IV shows our sample of 443 bankrupt firms by industry (two-digit SIC code). We obtain
information about primary SIC codes from the Compustat database. On average, our sample contains
8 firms per SIC code (the median is 6 firms per SIC code). The largest portion of our sample belongs
to the Communications industry (14.22%) followed by Business Services (5.87%) and the Electronic
and Other Electrical Equipment industry (4.29%).
Excluding any of these industries from the sample does not change our conclusions. Most industry
sub-samples consist of up to 10 firms. As we note above, most firms in our sample are non-service
firms (358). Our conclusions do not change if we analyze only non-service firms instead of the whole
sample.
Following Hotchkiss (1995) we describe the operating income of firms during the eight quarters prior to
the bankruptcy filing. We use two measures; operating income before depreciation and amortization
and operating income after depreciation and amortization.
Both measures are used to proxy for the existence of economic losses and distress. Operating loss, as
a pre-interest measure, is a strong indicator of economic distress of a firm because it does not include
the costs of financing and is limited to a firm’s operating activities. The operating loss also indicates
whether a firm is destroying its assets. Restructuring or liquidation in bankruptcy is often cited as
necessary to reverse the poor investment decisions that lead a firm to deplete its assets.
Table V shows the percentage of firms suffering quarterly operating losses in eight quarters prior
to the quarter when the firm filed for bankruptcy. The number of firms suffering operating losses,
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both before and after depreciation and amortization (DA), increases as a firm gets closer to filing for
bankruptcy. Between eight quarters pre-bankruptcy petition and one quarter pre-bankruptcy petition,
the proportion of firms with operating losses before depreciation and amortization increased from 26%
to 49%. The percentages increase to 40% and 69%, respectively, for operating losses after depreciation
and amortization.
Table VI shows mean and median operating losses before and after depreciation per quarter relative
to the bankruptcy filing. Operating income before DA turns negative only 3 quarters prior to the
bankruptcy filing and reaches the minimum of -1.05% (median of 0.07%) in the last quarter preced-
ing the bankruptcy filing. Operating income after DA turns is negative in all 8 quarters prior to
the bankruptcy filing reaching its minimum of -2.85% (median of -1.72%) the last quarter prior to
bankruptcy filing, with the median becoming negative 5 quarters before the filing. The first signs of
economic distress for most firms in our sample (evidenced by operating losses) occur in the two year
period prior to the bankruptcy filing.
We next conduct a search in the Lexis-Nexis merger and acquisition database to find firms that
liquidated some or all of their assets. Of the 443 firms in our sample, 168 (37.9%) firms liquidated at
least some of their assets (120 (27%) firms liquidated part of their assets and 48 (10.9%) firms were
taken over after declaring bankruptcy).10
B Comparison of DIP and SPIP Periods
We divide our 12 year sample of Chapter 11 filings into two sub-samples according to the changes
in bankruptcy practices that occurred in years 2000 and 2001: 1993-1999 (Debtor in Possession) and
2002-2004 (Secured Party in Possession). Firms filing for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11
during 2000 and 2001 were not included in this analysis as this is the period during which we believe
the change occurred. (As noted below, our results are not sensitive to this assumption.)
10There is a bias in our SPIP sample since part of bankruptcy cases filed in 2002-2004 period are not terminated, so
the percentage of cases with asset sales can only be higher.
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We perform the analysis of all the firms in the sample as well as for the non-service and service firms
separately, but we present the result for all firms and non-service firms only.
Table VII presents the operating income variables and financial ratios of firms filing under Chapter
11 for the two sub-samples (DIP and SPIP) and also presents the results of the t-test and Mann-
Whitney test of the difference between the means of two sub-samples for the economic measures
and financial ratios. Beginning with the first six operating income variables, only the ratio for 8
quarter operating income after depreciation and extraordinary expenses shows a statistically significant
difference between the two periods. As predicted this ratio was lower in the SPIP period than in
the DIP period. Specifically, between the two periods the ratio decreased from -7.61% to -20.07% on
average. The number of quarters of operating losses after depreciation, amortization and extraordinary
items increased from 4.15 to 5.00 (median from 4 to 5) in the SPIP period compared to the DIP period.
This change was significant and as predicted. The one year change of asset ratio in the DIP period
was 0.85 compared to 0.78 in the SPIP period. This is significant and as predicted. This difference
was even more pronounced for the two year change of asset ratio. The total assets of firms in the
DIP period increased by 11% in the two-year period preceding bankruptcy contrasting with an 18%
decrease for firms in the SPIP period. This too was significant and as predicted. Turning to the
financial ratios, leverage increased significantly, from 1.22 (median of 1) to 1.41 (median of 1.14).
The current ratio decreased significantly from 1.29 (median 0.98) to 1.00 (median 0.73). The changes
in leverage and current ratio are both as predicted. There was no statistically significant change in
the long term debt ratio. Additionally, the percentage of firms with negative equity prior to the
bankruptcy filing increased significantly from 49% (64 out of 130) to 63% (90 out of 143).11 The
results are consistent with a weaker financial and economic condition and a longer period of financial
distress for firms filing for bankruptcy in the SPIP compared to the DIP period. This supports our
hypothesis that a change in the legal environment or finance culture induced managers or creditors to
delay the filing of bankruptcy petitions.12
11The difference in proportions is significant at 5% level
12Current ratio and one-year change in assets show a statistically significant change at 10% level of significance
(two-tailed test) and 5% significance (one-tailed test)
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Next, we separate firms in economic distress from firms merely in financial distress by using the
number of quarters of operating losses as a proxy. To identify firms in economic distress, we use at
least one out of eight quarters of operating losses before depreciation and amortization. 13 Table
VIII shows economic indicators and financial ratios of economically distressed firms in the DIP and
SPIP periods. Although not unexpected, none of the 4-quarter operating returns show statistically
significant differences between means in the DIP and SPIP periods. By contrast, all of the 8-quarter
operating income return ratios deteriorated significantly in the SPIP period compared to the DIP
period. The operating return ratios decreased from 0.90% to -11.85% in the DIP versus SPIP period
before depreciation and amortization, from -14.36% to -26.33% after depreciation and amortization,
and from -9.79% to -21.65% after depreciation, amortization and extraordinary items. Leverage of
economically distressed firms increased from 1.21 to 1.47 (median from 0.99 to 1.16), while the current
ratio decreased from 1.34 to 1.00 (median from 1.05 to 0.74). The number of quarters of operating
losses increased significantly from 3.25 to 4.80 (operating losses) and from 4.46 to 5.20 (operating
losses after depreciation, amortization and extraordinary items). While assets of DIP firms increased
by 13% in the two year pre-petition period, assets of SPIP firms decreased by 22%. There was no
statistically significant difference between the one-year change in assets between DIP and SPIP firms.
The percentage of economically distressed firms with negative equity increased from 49% in the DIP
period to 62% in the SPIP period.
In addition to a univariate analysis, we run a multivariate analysis. We use a multivariate analysis
of covariance (MANCOVA) to analyze differences between the DIP and SPIP firms. The model is
comprised of five dependent variables representing financial and economic condition of bankrupt firms
at the time of filing: Leverage, Current Ratio, 2-year Operating Loss, 2-year Change in Assets, and
Number of Quarters of Operating Losses. The independent variable represents a change from DIP
to SPIP, with a value of 1 for the DIP period and 0 for SPIP period. As a covariate and control
variable we use Size (log of total assets). Table IX shows the MANCOVA results for all firms in our
sample and for only economically distressed firms (defined as firms suffering at least one quarter of
13Using other cut-offs or operating losses after depreciation and amortization does not change our conclusions.
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operating losses before DA in the 2-year period prior to filing for bankruptcy). This table also shows
the effect of each dependant variable considered separately. The results support our findings from the
univariate analysis and suggest that that delay in bankruptcy filing leads to higher leverage and a
larger decrease in total assets at the time of filing. After controlling for size, change from DIP to SPIP
accounts for 34% (39% for economically distressed firms) of the variability of financial variables and
economic indicators. For all firms, both effects (Size and change from DIP to SPIP) are statistically
significant at the 1% level. Also, the effects of DIP to SPIP are statistically significant at the 1% level
(Quarters of operating losses, Leverage and 2-year change in assets) and at the 5% (Current ratio and
the 2-year operating loss) in the univariate analysis. For economically distressed firms all effects for
DIPtoSPIP are statistically significant at 1% level except for the current ratio where it is significant
at the 10% level.
To further study economic distress, for each of the eight quarters prior to a bankruptcy filing we
identify the proportion of firms that suffered operating losses in that quarter. As shown in Table X,
except for the last two pre-bankruptcy quarters, SPIP firms have a larger proportion of economically
distressed firms. These results support the proposition that, at the time of a bankruptcy filing,
firms in the SPIP period have suffered economic distress for a longer period of time than their DIP
counterparts.
We also examine liquidation rates. In the DIP period, 23 out of 133 firms (17.29%) liquidated at least
some of their assets: 15 (11.28%) firms liquidated only part of their assets while 8 (6.01%) firms were
acquired by another company after the bankruptcy declaration. The number of firms liquidated in
part or in whole increases substantially in the SPIP period to 51.45% (71 out of 138 firms): 50 firms
(36.23%) liquidated some of their assets and 21 (15.22%) were acquired by another company after
filing for bankruptcy.
Our liquidation results are consistent with the findings of Aug et al. (2003) who find that in 84% of
all Chapter 11s after 2001 the investors entered bankruptcy with a deal in hand or used the process to
sell the assets of the business. These data indicate a shift in major Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases from
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reorganization to liquidation (and this holds whether or not the definition of liquidation includes those
cases that involve the takeover of a going concern). One explanation for the shift toward liquidation
may be that in the SPIP period creditor control of the bankruptcy process facilitated liquidation of
non viable firms while in the DIP period the debtor control did not. Another explanation for the
shift may be that a greater percentage of firms in the SPIP period deteriorated beyond salvation by
the time of the bankruptcy filing. In either case, the delay in bankruptcy initiation corresponds to a
deteriorated financial condition and an increase in economic losses.
As noted in part 2, we do not attribute any of these results to the possibility of a censored sample
in the SPIP period. Such a sample might exist if in the SPIP period more than in the DIP period,
better firms were screened out of the bankruptcy process altogether. An implication of this change,
however, would be a lower incidence of bankruptcy in the latter period, controlling for the general
economy, and we observe no such decline in the bankruptcy rate.
IV Sensitivity of Results to Various Assumptions
A Changes in the Economic Environment
The changes in economic measures and financial ratios from the DIP to SPIP period could be due, at
least in part, to changes in the economic environment. To examine the changes in the economic envi-
ronment we compute economic indicators and financial ratios of all firms in the Compustat database
to see how they changed over our time period, and specifically in the DIP versus SPIP periods.14
For our sample of all firms, we use the population of US incorporated firms in the Compustat database
and then eliminate all firms with total liabilities lower than $100 million. We then eliminate the
financial firms, and further separate service and non-service firms (matching our procedures for our
sample of bankrupt firms). As the data described in this part demonstrate, economic indicators and
14Removing the bankrupt firms from the total sample has no significant impact on the results, due to the small
number of bankruptcy firms in comparison to the entire population of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms
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financial ratios of non-bankrupt firms move in the sample period either in the opposite direction
from the bankrupt sample indicators and ratios or did not experience a significant change. Thus,
the deterioration in economic and financial condition of bankrupt firms in the SPIP period compared
to the DIP period does not appear to be driven by any economy wide changes. The non-bankrupt
firms economic and financial conditions improved while the economic and financial conditions of the
bankrupt firms deteriorated.
We compute the differences between the economic indicators and financial ratios of a bankrupt firm
and the median economic indicators and financial ratios of all non bankrupt firms in the same quarter
to obtain median adjusted indicators and ratios (MA). The median adjusted indicators and ratios
show the distance of bankrupt firm to the median of all firms in the population. The increase in dis-
tance implies a worsening financial and economic condition against a baseline of the general economic
environment. This analysis supports our results for non-adjusted economic indicators and financial
ratios.
Next, we analyze bankrupt firms in the DIP and SPIP periods by industry. Table XI shows the
distribution of firms by two-digit SIC code in DIP and SPIP periods.
Excluding major industries or industry divisions (according to SIC classification) does not change our
conclusions about changes in economic measures and financial ratios of bankrupt firms in the DIP
period compared to the SPIP period.
In addition, we repeat the multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) for industry adjusted ratios
for all firms in our sample and then only for economically distressed firms. Table XII shows these
results, which indicate that after adjusting for industry medians, the financial and economic condition
of bankrupt firms again deteriorate between the DIP and SPIP periods, consistent with greater filing
delay in the latter period. After controlling for size, change from DIP to SPIP accounts for 25%
(33% for economically distressed firms) of the variability of industry adjusted financial variables and
economic indicators. Both effects (Size and change from DIP to SPIP) are statistically significant at
1% level. The effect of DIP to SPIP is statistically significant at the 1% level for each variable in the
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univariate analysis except for Current Ratio, which is significant at the 5% level for all firms and not
significant for economically distressed firms.
B Period of Changes in the Legal System and Practices
As discussed above, we have assumed that the the changes in the legal system occurred between the
years 2000 and 2001. In most US states (46 plus DC), the aforementioned expansion of secured creditor
rights under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) took effect by July 1, 2001; these
changes took effect by January 1, 2002 in the remainder. The changes in bankruptcy proceedings,
while difficult to pinpoint, were underway in the year 2000. In our main results, we decided to
exclude years 2000 and 2001 from the analysis. In order to examine whether our results change if
the sample is divided in some other way, we tested the difference between economic measures and
financial ratios of firms that filed for bankruptcy pre and post the second half of 2001. Our results
do not change. Bankrupt firms’ and industry median adjusted bankrupt firms’ economic measures
and financial ratios show statistically significant change for the whole sample, as well as for the
economically distressed firms only. When we exclude the entire year 2001 from the analysis (the year
when the changes of Article 9 took effect) the results also remain the same. Comparing years 1999 and
2002 also supports our main findings and show statistically significant differences between DIP and
SPIP economic measures and financial ratios. Although we did not run a time series analysis, none
of our conclusions would be altered if the changes we document occurred gradually over the period in
question rather than at once.
C Market Variables and Bankruptcy Prediction Models
Our analysis is based on variables that in our opinion best describe a delay in bankruptcy filing.
However, other tests are possible. Bankruptcy prediction variables, which are used to discriminate
between firms that are likely to file for bankruptcy and those that are not, could be used to discriminate
between firms filing early and those filing late. This is so because the same factors that indicate
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whether a firm is likely to file for bankruptcy ex ante may also indicate that the firm delayed filing,
relative to other firms, ex post. The empirical use of financial information to predict bankruptcy began
with the discriminant analysis employed by Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968). Ohlson (1980) and
Zmijewski (1984) extended this work with logit and probit models. Most of the subsequent research
in this area has focused on the appropriate statistical methods used to develop the model, finding the
variables which best discriminate between the bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms, and demonstrating
the performance of the prediction model by examining the percentage of firms predicted correctly.15
The newest models of bankruptcy prediction include Begley et al.(1996) and Shumway (2001). In
Table XIII we use the model from Begley et al.(1996) to compute the probability of bankruptcy of
each firm in our sample16. This model has the following parameters:
10.4xWC/TA+ 1.0xRE/TA+ 10.6xEBIT/TA+ 0.6xME/TL+ 1.00xS/TA
where WC = working capital, RE = retained earnings, EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes,
ME = market value of equity, S = sales, TL = total liabilities and TA = total assets.
When we run this prediction model on our DIP and SPIP samples, all variables except for EBIT show
the predicted statistically significant difference between the two periods. These results are consistent
with those in the previous sections of this study.
V Conclusion
Longstanding theory predicts that an insolvent debtor will file for bankruptcy only when default is
imminent, even where an earlier filing might have stemmed deterioration of the firm’s value. The
bankruptcy reform act of 1978 built in a relatively soft landing for the debtor’s managers (debtor-
in-possession) and thus its owners. Generous bankruptcy treatment of managers and owners could
15For a review of the literature see Zavgren (1983) and Jones (1987).
16Using other bankruptcy prediction models described in Shumway(2001) does not change our conclusions.
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encourage managers to file somewhat earlier as such treatment leaves managers relatively less incentive
to permit a decline in firm value in the hope of an unlikely reversal of fortune. Recently, it has become
possible to test managerial reactions to bankruptcy incentives. Between 2000 and 2001, perhaps
prompted by a change in the Uniform Commercial Code, bankruptcy practice shifted from debtor
control of the bankruptcy process to control by secured creditors. This paper examines the financial
and economic conditions of firms that filed for bankruptcy from 1993 through 2004 to determine
whether these changes exacerbated the managers’ incentives to delay filing for bankruptcy.
Our investigation reveals a deterioration in the financial and economic health of firms at the time of
their bankruptcy filing in the post 2001 SPIP (Secured Party in Possession) period as compared to
the pre 2000 DIP (Debtor in Possession) period. This relative deterioration cannot be explained by
general economic changes or related changes of firms not filing for bankruptcy. We also find that in
the latter period more than the former liquidation was the final outcome of the bankruptcy process.
These results support two important hypotheses. First, managers react to changes in the bankruptcy
law, which is thus shown to matter as a source of ex ante incentives; in this case, the result is delayed
resolution of financial distress. Managers increasingly file for bankruptcy only after financial distress
becomes acute, or they cede the filing decision to a dominant secured creditor who delays filing until the
debtor’s finances are desperate. Second, many firms in financial distress are also in economic distress
and so exacerbation of the bankruptcy initiation problem has economic consequences. Specifically, if
bankruptcy corrects inefficient investment incentives through recapitalization or liquidation, a delay in
bankruptcy may also delay such correction. These findings call into question the belief that bankruptcy
practice in the SPIP period has effectively cured the debt overhang problem. Even for those who
believe that the modern trend of creditor control in Chapter 11 is a positive one, encouraging eventual
optimal disposition of a distressed firm, the effects of the trend are self-limited.
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As such our findings have implications for legislative policy, specifically for bankruptcy law as reg-
ulation of capital structure and economic distress. In particular, our results support the need for
Congress to address the bankruptcy initiation problem so that firms cannot waste assets before filing
for bankruptcy just as they may have formerly wasted them afterward.
30
References
Adler, B.E. 1992. “Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation.” Cornell Law Review 77:439–489.
. 1998. “Accelerated Resolution of Financial Distress.”Washington University Law Quarterly
76:1169–1204.
Altman, E.I. 1968. “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Predictions of Corporate
Bankruptcy.” Journal of Finance 23:589–609.
Altman, E.I., and S. Jha. 2003. “Report on Market Size and Investment Performance of Defaulted
Bonds and Bank Loans: 1987-2002.” Technical Report, New York University Salomon Center,
Leonard N. Stern School of Business.
Andrade, G., and S. N. Kaplan. 1998. “How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence
from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed.” Journal of Finance 53:1443–1493.
Aug, J.V., L.R. Ahern, R.M. Meth, and J. Greenstone Miller. 2003. “The Plan of Reorganization:
A Thing of the Past.” Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 13:3–60.
Baird, D.G., and R.K. Rasmussen. 2002. “The End of Bankruptcy.” Stanford Law Review 55:751–789.
. 2003. “Chapter 11 at Twilight.” Stanford Law Review 56:673–699.
. 2005. “Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance.” Vanderbilt Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 05-08; U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No.
247.
Beaver, W.H. 1966. “Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure, Empirical Research in Accounting:
Selected Studies.” Journal of Accounting Research 4:71–111.
Bebchuk, L.A. 2002. “Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy.” Journal of
Finance 57:445–460.
Bebchuk, L.A., and H. Chang. 1992. “Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorgani-
zation.” Journal of Law Economics and Organization 8:253–279.
31
Begley, J., J. Ming, and S. Watts. 1996. “Bankruptcy Classification Errors in the 1980s: An Empirical
Analysis of Altman’s and Ohlson’s Models.” Review of Accounting Studies 1:267–284.
Bris, A., I. Welch, and N. Zhu. 2004. “The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Cash Auctions vs.
Chapter 11 Bargaining.” Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-13.
Dahiya, S., K. John, M. Puri, and G. Ramı´rez. 2003. “Debtor-in-Possession Financing and
Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical evidence.” Journal of Financial Economics 69:259–280.
Donoher, W.J. 2004. “To File Or Not To File? Systemic Incentives, Corporate Control, and the
Bankruptcy Decision.” Journal of Management 30:239–262.
Eberhart, A.C., W.T. Moore, and R.L. Roenfeldt. 1990. “Security Pricing and Deviations from the
Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings.” Journal of Finance 45:1457–1469.
Eckbo, E.B., and K.S. Thorburn. 2003. “Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in Automatic
Bankruptcy Auctions.” Journal of Financial Economics 69:227–258.
Franks, J.R., and W.N. Torous. 1989. “An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization.”
Journal of Finance 44:747–769.
Gilson, S.C. 1990. “Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders : Evidence on Changes in Corpo-
rate Ownership and Control when Firms Default.” Journal of Financial Economics 27:355–387.
Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1998. “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 1:1–41.
Hotchkiss, E.S. 1995. “Postbankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover.” Journal of Finance
50:3–21.
Jackson, T.H. 1986. The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law. Harvard University Press.
Jensen, M.C. 1988. “Their Causes and Consequences.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2:21–49.
. 1991. “Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
4:13–33.
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling. 1976. “The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3:305–350.
32
Jones, F.L. 1987. “Current Techniques in Bankruptcy Prediction.” Journal of Accounting Literature
6:131–164.
LoPucki, L.M. 2003. “The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen’s
The End of Bankruptcy.” Stanford Law Review 56:645–672.
Maksimovic, V., and G. Phillips. 1998. “Asset Efficiency and Reallocation Decisions of Bankrupt
Firms.” Journal of Finance 53:1495–1532.
Ohlson, J. 1980. “Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy.” Journal of
Accounting Research 18:109–131.
Povel, P. 1999. “Optimal Soft or Tough Bankruptcy Procedures.” Journal of Law Economics and
Organization 15:659–684.
Shumway, T. 2001. “Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model.” Journal
of Bussiness 74:101–124.
Skeel, D.A. 2003. “Creditors’ Ball: The ’New’ New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11.”University
of Pennsylvania Law Review 152:917–951.
Warren, E., and J.L. Westbrook. 2003. “Secured Party in Possession.”American Bankruptcy Institute
Journal, September.
Weiss, L.A. 1990. “Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims.” Journal
of Financial Economics 27:285–314.
Weiss, L.A., and V. Capkun. 2006. “Bankruptcy Resolution: Priority of Claims with the Secured
Creditor in Control.” Working Paper, University of Lausanne.
Weiss, L.A., and K.Wruck. 1998. “Information Problems, Conflicts of Interest and Asset Stripping:
Chapter 11’s Failure in the Case of Eastern Airlines.” Journal of Financial Economics 48:56–97.
Zavgren, C.V. 1983. “The Prediction of Corporate Failure. The State of the Art.” Journal of
Accounting Literature 21:1–38.
Zmijewski, M.E. Studies on Current Econometric Issues in Accounting Research, 1984. “Method-
33
ological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Model.” Journal of
Accounting Research 22:59–86.
34
Table I: GDP growth rates and bankruptcy filings in the 1993-2004 period
Number of firms filing for bankruptcy was identified from Altman’s bankruptcy
database, number of all firms per year was obtained from the Compustat database.
Firms represent all firms in Altman and Compustat databases with liabilities that
exceed US$100 million. Bankruptcy rate is the percentage of bankruptcy filings
in the total number of firms. GDP growth rates represent annual increase in the
gross domestic product of the United States.
GDP increase (%) Number of bankruptcies All Firms Bankruptcy rate
1993 2.70 24 3662 0.66%
1994 4.00 24 3863 0.62%
1995 2.50 35 4141 0.85%
1996 3.70 32 4352 0.74%
1997 4.50 36 4459 0.81%
1998 4.20 51 4736 1.08%
1999 4.40 101 4921 2.05%
2000 3.70 125 4892 2.56%
2001 0.80 171 4678 3.66%
2002 1.90 121 4570 2.65%
2003 3.00 95 4557 2.08%
2004 4.40 44 4489 0.98%
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Table III: Annual bankruptcy filings
Number of firms filing for protection under Chapter 11 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code
per year. Data was collected from Altman’s bankruptcy database, Pacer and filings
with the Securities and Exchange Commission and presents non-financial bankrupt
firms with total liabilities of over US$ 100 million in the year preceding bankruptcy
filing. Service firms have two-digit SIC code lower than 60, and Non-Service firms
two-digit SIC code higher than 69
Bankruptcy filing per year
Year of filing Service firms Non-Service firms All firms %
1993 0 8 8 1.81%
1994 0 13 13 2.93%
1995 1 12 13 2.93%
1996 3 17 20 4.51%
1997 2 14 16 3.61%
1998 1 18 19 4.29%
1999 9 33 42 9.48%
2000 20 40 60 13.54%
2001 26 83 109 24.60%
2002 12 65 77 17.38%
2003 11 41 52 11.74%
2004 0 14 14 3.16%
Total 85 358 443 100.00%
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Table IV: Bankrupt firms by industry
The sample of 443 US based firms that filed for bankruptcy in the January 1993-March 2004 period. Firms
in the sample have total liabilities that exceed $ 100 million. Industry classification is based on 2-digit SIC
codes. The sample was obtained from Altman’s bankruptcy database, and information about SIC codes from
the Compustat database.
2-digit SIC code Number of firms %
01: Agricultural Production Crops 1 0.23%
10: Metal Mining 1 0.23%
12: Coal Mining 3 0.68%
13: Oil And Gas Extraction 9 2.03%
14: Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 2 0.45%
15: Building Construction General Contractors And Operative Builders 2 0.45%
16: Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors 2 0.45%
17: Construction Special Trade Contractors 3 0.68%
20: Food And Kindred Products 9 2.03%
22: Textile Mill Products 12 2.71%
23: Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Sim-
ilar Materials
9 2.03%
24: Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture 3 0.68%
25: Furniture And Fixtures 1 0.23%
26: Paper And Allied Products 9 2.03%
27: Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 3 0.68%
28: Chemicals And Allied Products 15 3.39%
29: Petroleum Refining And Related Industries 1 0.23%
30: Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 4 0.90%
31: Leather And Leather Products 1 0.23%
32: Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 5 1.13%
33: Primary Metal Industries 14 3.16%
34: Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Transportation
Equipment
4 0.90%
35: Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 16 3.61%
36: Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except
Computer Equipment
19 4.29%
37: Transportation Equipment 9 2.03%
38: Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic,
Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
4 0.90%
39: Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 4 0.90%
41: Local And Suburban Transit And Interurban Highway Passenger
Transportation
2 0.45%
42: Motor Freight Transportation And Warehousing 5 1.13%
44: Water Transportation 3 0.68%
45: Transportation By Air 7 1.58%
47: Transportation Services 1 0.23%
48: Communications 63 14.22%
49: Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 17 3.84%
50: Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 17 3.84%
51: Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 6 1.35%
52: Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, And Mobile Home
Dealers
9 2.03%
53: General Merchandise Stores 10 2.26%
54: Food Stores 10 2.26%
56: Apparel And Accessory Stores 10 2.26%
57: Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores 10 2.26%
58: Eating And Drinking Places 11 2.48%
59: Miscellaneous Retail 12 2.71%
70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places 1 0.23%
72: Personal Services 1 0.23%
73: Business Services 26 5.87%
75: Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking 3 0.68%
78: Motion Pictures 10 2.26%
79: Amusement And Recreation Services 13 2.93%
80: Health Services 17 3.84%
83: Social Services 3 0.68%
87: Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Ser-
vices
9 2.03%
99: Nonclassifiable Establishments 2 0.45%
443 100.00%
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Table VI: Quarterly operating income prior to bankruptcy filing
Quarterly operating income of bankrupt firms prior to bankruptcy filing. -8 to
-1 are quarters relative to bankruptcy filing, operating income and operating
income after depreciation and amortization (DA) are % operating income over
total assets. The list of bankrupt firms was obtained from Altman’s bankruptcy
database, Pacer and SEC filings. Data on operating income was collected from
the Compustat database.
operating income before DA operating income after DA
quarter mean median N mean median N
-8 1.44% 2.13% *** 375 -0.11% 0.81% *** 375
-7 0.38% 1.76% *** 382 -1.18% 0.49% 381
-6 0.67% 1.50% *** 397 -1.07% 0.21% 396
-5 0.30% 1.29% *** 404 -1.33% -0.11% ** 403
-4 0.25% 1.07% *** 392 -1.48% -0.40% *** 391
-3 -0.27% 0.72% ** 399 -2.04% -0.58% *** 398
-2 -0.52% 0.38% 404 -2.28% -1.09% *** 403
-1 -1.05% 0.07% ** 412 -2.85% -1.72% *** 411
***,** - Wilcoxon signed rank test significance at 1% and 5% level respectively.
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Table VII: Financial variables in DIP and SPIP periods
Financial variables of bankrupt firms in the Debtor in Possession (DIP=1993-1999) and the
Secured Party in Possession (SPIP=2002-2004) periods. All financial information was collected
from the Compustat database. The list of bankrupt firms was collected from Altman’s bankruptcy
database, Pacer and SEC and represents US non-financial firms with liabilities in excess of $ 100
million in the year prior to filing for bankruptcy.
Mean Median
DIP SPIP DIP SPIP MW TT
Number of firms 131 143 131 143
4 quarter operating income -2.04% -1.22% 0.34% 1.15%
4 quarter operating income - da -8.75% -7.90% -5.56% -3.85%
4 quarter operating income - da-ei -8.82% -10.43% -6.03% -7.15%
8 quarter operating income 7.89% -0.54% 10.35% 6.59% **
8 quarter operating income - da -8.10% -14.86% -1.23% -3.46%
8 quarter operating income - da-ei -7.61% -20.07% -1.80% -9.24% *** ***
leverage 1.2155 1.4144 0.9994 1.1426 ** **
current ratio-year end 1.2905 0.9959 0.9765 0.7271 * *
size (log of total assets) 5.7417 6.1904 5.5052 5.9456 ** ***
long term debt/total assets 0.3569 0.3588 0.2678 0.1156
quarters of op losses -da-ei 4.15 5.00 4.00 5.00 ** **
change in assets -1year 0.8533 0.7811 0.8323 0.8056 * *
change in assets -2years 1.1142 0.8174 0.8780 0.7620 *** ***
***,**,* - 1%, 5% and 10% level according to Mann Whitney (MW) or t-test (TT).
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Table IX: MANCOVA analysis of financial and economic variables
MANCOVA. Independent variable is DIP (1) or SPIP (0) period, and a covariate
size (log of total assets). Financial variables of bankrupt firms in the Debtor in
Possession (DIP=1993-1999) and the Secured Party in Possession (SPIP=2002-2004)
periods were collected from the Compustat database. The list of bankrupt firms was
collected from Altman’s bankruptcy database, Pacer and SEC and represents US
non-financial firms with liabilities in excess of $ 100 million in the year prior to filing
for bankruptcy. Sig is the significance level.
All Firms
MANCOVA
Hotelling’s Trace F Sig Partial Eta Squared
Size 0.226 8.450 0.000 0.184
DIPorSPIP 1.030 19.150 0.000 0.340
N 194
Between Subject Effects
Dependent Variable F Sig. Partial Eta Squared
Model quarters of operating losses 67.224 0.000 0.514
leverage 231.188 0.000 0.784
current ratio 36.787 0.000 0.366
2-year operating loss 4.489 0.005 0.066
2-year change in assets 144.709 0.000 0.694
Size quarters of operating losses 2.624 0.107 0.014
leverage 39.982 0.000 0.173
current ratio 0.183 0.670 0.001
2-year operating loss 6.658 0.011 0.034
2-year change in assets 9.397 0.002 0.047
DIPorSPIP quarters of operating losses 11.086 0.000 0.104
leverage 69.268 0.000 0.420
current ratio 3.070 0.049 0.031
2-year operating loss 4.261 0.015 0.043
2-year change in assets 8.510 0.000 0.082
Economically distressed firms
MANCOVA
Hotelling’s Trace F Sig Eta Squared
Size 0.276 7.121 0.000 0.216
DIPorSPIP 1.278 16.360 0.000 0.390
N 136
Between Subject Effects
Dependent Variable F Sig. Partial Eta Squared
Model quarters of operating losses 127.344 0.000 0.742
leverage 165.729 0.000 0.789
current ratio 22.551 0.000 0.337
2-year operating loss 4.638 0.004 0.095
2-year change in assets 79.027 0.000 0.641
Size quarters of operating losses 0.408 0.524 0.003
leverage 35.566 0.000 0.211
current ratio 0.038 0.846 0.000
2-year operating loss 3.539 0.062 0.026
2-year change in assets 5.009 0.027 0.036
DIPorSPIP quarters of operating losses 16.307 0.000 0.197
leverage 58.098 0.000 0.466
current ratio 2.707 0.070 0.039
2-year operating loss 5.437 0.005 0.076
2-year change in assets 5.104 0.007 0.071
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Table X: Quarterly operating losses prior to bankruptcy filing in DIP and SPIP periods
Quarterly operating losses of bankrupt firms prior
to bankruptcy filing in Debtor in Possession
(DIP=1993-1998) and Secured Party in Possession
(SPIP=2002-2004) periods. -8 to -1 are quarters rel-
ative to bankruptcy filing. DIP and SPIP are num-
bers of firms with operating losses before depreci-
ation and amortization. N is the total number of
firms in the quarter and % is the percentage of firms
with operating losses with respect to the total num-
ber of firms. List of bankrupt firms was obtained
from Altman’s bankruptcy database, Pacer and SEC
filings. Data on operating income was collected from
the Compustat database.
DIP N % SPIP N %
-8 23 112 20.54% 38 133 28.57%
-7 18 111 16.22% 40 129 31.01%
-6 35 114 30.70% 47 133 35.34%
-5 33 118 27.97% 50 136 36.76%
-4 35 117 29.91% 52 127 40.94%
-3 45 117 38.46% 60 131 45.80%
-2 55 117 47.01% 57 134 42.54%
-1 65 120 54.17% 58 137 42.34%
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Table XI: Bankrupt firms by industry in DIP and SPIP periods
Sample of 443 US based firms that filed for bankruptcy in the January 1993-March 2004 period. Firms in the
sample have total liabilities that exceed $ 100 million. Industry classification is based on 2-digit SIC codes. DIP
is the Debtor in Possession period from 1993 to 1998 and SPIP is the Secured Party in Possession period from
2002 to 2004. The sample was obtained from Altman’s bankruptcy database, and information about SIC codes
from the Compustat database.
2-digit SIC code DIP # DIP % SPIP # SPIP %
01: Agricultural Production Crops 0.00% 0.00%
10: Metal Mining 1 0.76% 0.00%
12: Coal Mining 2 1.52% 0.00%
13: Oil And Gas Extraction 6 4.55% 2 1.40%
14: Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 0.00% 2 1.40%
15: Building Construction General Contractors And Operative
Builders
2 1.52% 0.00%
16: Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Con-
tractors
1 0.76% 0.00%
17: Construction Special Trade Contractors 1 0.76% 2 1.40%
20: Food And Kindred Products 2 1.52% 3 2.10%
22: Textile Mill Products 4 3.03% 4 2.80%
23: Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics
And Similar Materials
5 3.79% 2 1.40%
24: Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture 0.00% 2 1.40%
25: Furniture And Fixtures 0.00% 1 0.70%
26: Paper And Allied Products 2 1.52% 1 0.70%
27: Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 2 1.52% 0.00%
28: Chemicals And Allied Products 2 1.52% 7 4.90%
29: Petroleum Refining And Related Industries 1 0.76% 0.00%
30: Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 0.00% 2 1.40%
31: Leather And Leather Products 0.00% 1 0.70%
32: Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 1 0.76% 1 0.70%
33: Primary Metal Industries 2 1.52% 10 6.99%
34: Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Trans-
portation Equipment
1 0.76% 2 1.40%
35: Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equip-
ment
7 5.30% 2 1.40%
36: Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components,
Except Computer Equipment
3 2.27% 9 6.29%
37: Transportation Equipment 3 2.27% 3 2.10%
38: Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photo-
graphic, Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
2 1.52% 1 0.70%
39: Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 2 1.52% 0.00%
41: Local And Suburban Transit And Interurban Highway Pas-
senger Transportation
1 0.76% 0.00%
42: Motor Freight Transportation And Warehousing 2 1.52% 1 0.70%
44: Water Transportation 1 0.76% 1 0.70%
45: Transportation By Air 1 0.76% 4 2.80%
47: Transportation Services 0.00% 0.00%
48: Communications 13 9.85% 28 19.58%
49: Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 3 2.27% 9 6.29%
50: Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 4 3.03% 4 2.80%
51: Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 0.00% 2 1.40%
52: Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, And Mobile
Home Dealers
7 5.30% 1 0.70%
53: General Merchandise Stores 8 6.06% 1 0.70%
54: Food Stores 6 4.55% 1 0.70%
56: Apparel And Accessory Stores 6 4.55% 2 1.40%
57: Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores 4 3.03% 2 1.40%
58: Eating And Drinking Places 4 3.03% 5 3.50%
59: Miscellaneous Retail 4 3.03% 2 1.40%
70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places 0.00% 0.00%
72: Personal Services 1 0.76% 0.00%
73: Business Services 2 1.52% 10 6.99%
75: Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking 0.00% 2 1.40%
78: Motion Pictures 1 0.76% 0.00%
79: Amusement And Recreation Services 5 3.79% 2 1.40%
80: Health Services 5 3.79% 6 4.20%
83: Social Services 0.00% 1 0.70%
87: Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Re-
lated Services
1 0.76% 2 1.40%
99: Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 0.76% 0.00%
132 100.00% 143 100.00%
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Table XII: MANCOVA of industry adjusted financial variables on DIP and SPIP periods
MANCOVA. Independent variable is DIP (1) or SPIP (0) period, and covariate size (log
of total assets). Industry median adjusted financial variables of bankrupt firms in the
Debtor in Possession (DIP=1993-1999) and the Secured Party in Possession (SPIP=2002-
2004) periods were collected from the Compustat database. The list of bankrupt firms
was collected from Altman’s bankruptcy database, Pacer and SEC and represents US
non-financial firms with liabilities in excess of $ 100 million in the year prior to filing for
bankruptcy. Sig is the significance level.
All Firms
MANCOVA
Hotelling’s Trace F Sig Eta Squared
Size 0.264 9.699 0.000 0.209
DIPorSPIP 0.683 12.492 0.000 0.254
N 191
Between Subject Effects
Dependent Variable F Sig. Partial Eta Squared
Model quarters of operating losses 66.227 0.000 0.514
leverage 78.372 0.000 0.556
current ratio 20.377 0.000 0.245
2-year operating loss 70.687 0.000 0.530
2-year change in assets 11.200 0.000 0.152
Size quarters of operating losses 2.268 0.134 0.012
leverage 43.251 0.000 0.187
current ratio 1.114 0.293 0.006
2-year operating loss 9.673 0.002 0.049
2-year change in assets 8.529 0.004 0.043
DIPorSPIP quarters of operating losses 10.558 0.000 0.101
leverage 46.494 0.000 0.331
current ratio 3.633 0.028 0.037
2-year operating loss 18.100 0.000 0.161
2-year change in assets 8.941 0.000 0.087
Economically distressed firms
MANCOVA
Hotelling’s Trace F Sig Eta Squared
Size 0.338 8.523 0.000 0.253
DIPorSPIP 0.972 12.151 0.000 0.327
N 133
Between Subject Effects
Dependent Variable F Sig. Partial Eta Squared
Model quarters of operating losses 126.852 0.000 0.745
leverage 62.636 0.000 0.591
current ratio 11.576 0.000 0.211
2-year operating loss 78.530 0.000 0.644
2-year change in assets 5.673 0.001 0.116
Size quarters of operating losses 0.218 0.642 0.002
leverage 39.794 0.000 0.234
current ratio 0.751 0.388 0.006
2-year operating loss 5.154 0.025 0.038
2-year change in assets 4.607 0.034 0.034
DIPorSPIP quarters of operating losses 14.933 0.000 0.187
leverage 42.525 0.000 0.395
current ratio 2.267 0.108 0.034
2-year operating loss 14.518 0.000 0.183
2-year change in assets 4.952 0.008 0.071
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Table XIII: Bankruptcy prediction model results in DIP and SPIP periods
Begley et al.(1996) bankruptcy prediction model results in DIP and SPIP periods.
WC = working capital, RE = retained earnings, EBIT = earnings before interest
and taxes, ME = market value of equity, S = sales, TL = total liabilities and TA
= total assets. TT and MW are significance levels according to the t-test and the
Mann-Whitney test. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
All firms
DIP SPIP
N Mean Median N Mean Median TT MW
Score 85 -5.4212 -3.4849 92 -9.3884 -6.6283 ** ***
WC/TA 123 -0.3396 -0.1333 133 -0.5936 -0.4595 *** **
RE/TA 125 -0.7455 -0.3520 135 -1.4095 -0.5957 *** ***
EBIT/TA 110 -0.0880 -0.0558 121 -0.0790 -0.0385
ME/TA 108 0.2018 0.0619 114 0.0839 0.0260 *** ***
S/TA 126 1.1412 1.0014 137 0.9069 0.7710 ** **
Economically distressed
DIP SPIP
N Mean Median N Mean Median TT MW
Score 71 -5.7995 -3.5355 64 -10.6554 -7.6955 *** ***
WC/TA 101 -0.3398 -0.1191 96 -0.6284 -0.4841 *** ***
RE/TA 104 -0.8024 -0.3639 98 -1.6616 -0.6346 *** ***
EBIT/TA 87 -0.1215 -0.0784 81 -0.1241 -0.0977
ME/TA 92 0.1956 0.0655 83 0.0938 0.0254 ** ***
S/TA 97 0.9916 1.0855 103 0.7506 0.9414 *
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